The Pew Forum has a chart listing the religious affiliation of U.S. presidents. Episcopalians are the largest group, way above their proportion in the general population. Presbyterians also are over-represented.

Unitarians also are present in numbers far above their share of the population, though none more recent than Taft. Unitarians are the only non-Christian group present, denying the Trinity and the Divinity of Christ.

Andrew Johnson was our last president without a formal religious affiliation, sharing that category with Abraham Lincoln and Thomas Jefferson. I am not sure that we would elect someone without church membership to the White House today.

For what it's worth, Bill Clinton and Warren Harding both were/are Baptists.

I am not sure that Andrew Jackson is in the correct category. If I get ambitious tonight I'll try to check on it. UPDATE: According to Robert Remini Jackson's people were Presbyterian. He himself united with the Hermitage Presbyterian Church in 1838, after the White House. Had he been baptized as an infant? Remini does not say.
In honor of the inauguration, I continue to ask what skills are needed for a successful presidency. In the first post I examined the presidency of James K. Polk and drew from his success these lessons: 1. make rational decisions, 2. don't be afraid of unpopularity with your own party, 3. keep focused on rational goals. Farmer suggested that qualities 1 and perhaps 3 could be summarized as having a keen grasp of the possible.

Abraham Lincoln has been on my mind the last few days. (I wonder why.) Many, many things can be said about his strengths as president, but I will focus on three.

First, he recognized the greatest challenge facing his presidency--the secession of several Southern states--and the imperative for his office--to reestablish the Union. From this imperative he never wavered, in spite of the cost of the war, and the opposition of the Copperheads.

Second, he was able to communicate his goal for the conflict, even as that goal evolved and gained complexity. Lincoln articulated his war aims in terms of the nation's founding ideals, as in the Gettysburg Address.

Third, Lincoln recognized that history was bigger than he or the Federal Government. Though he rejected the church (and the politics) of his father Thomas, in the end he understood that the Sovereign God of his father was at work in the war. This belief strengthened his resolve, and kept him from identifying the cause of the Union was absolute good. See his Second Innaugural Address.

From Lincoln: recognize the greatest challenge and hold to the imperative it generates, communicate goals as they evolve in a way that ties them in with our national story, and acknowledge that there is a purpose in history that transcends our own plans.
I hope to do more thinking about this question over the next week or two as we get ready for a new president of the United States. Prompted by reflections on Farmer and Mariner's thoughts on education and presidents, I offer the following.

To begin, let's take a little known, but successful U.S. President as judged by most historians: James K. Polk.

Three things stand out about him to my mind.

First, he remained rational in emotional times, making rational decisions. For example, Polk, a Democrat, came into office with looming conflicts betwen the U.S. and Great Britain and Mexico. With Mexico over the recent aquistion of Texas, combined with the claim of Texas for territory down to the Rio Grande. With Great Britain over the boundary between the U.S. and Canada in the Northwest. Both issues generated lots of emotion. His own party had campaigned on the slogan of "54 40" or fight!" In other words, take all the disputed territory in the Northwest or go to war with Britain. But, when in office, instead of being swayed by the emotion of the moment and going to war with the British Empire (especially since war with Mexico seemed likely), he entered into negotiations that resulted in the present boundary between British Columbia and Washington State and eastward.

Second, as seen above, he was willing to be unpopular with his own party. Polk did not simply follow what seemed the prevailing opinion of the moment among voters. In addition to acting rationally in the above situation, he risked rejection by elements of his own party.

Third, he kept focused on his goals. He wanted to ensure that Texas was safely part of the United States, and he wanted to add California, then part of Mexico. When negotiations broke down, he used military force--probably upon a pretext--to acquire California and the Southwest, plus force Mexico to recognize that Texas was now part of the United States. As the War with Mexico proceeded, however, some Democrats pushed for the conquest and aquisition of all Mexico. Polk, instead, entered into new negotiations from a position of military superiority on the battlefield, gaining his goals.

From Polk: the ability to analyze a situation rationally and act accordingly, the willingness to go against one's own party if deemed necessary, and the steadiness to hold to rational goals.
In an essay for TIME entitled "The Bush Administration's Most Despicable Act," Klein makes this assertion:

"This is not the America I know," President George W. Bush said after the first, horrifying pictures of U.S. troops torturing prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq surfaced in April 2004. The President was not telling the truth. "This" was the America he had authorized on Feb. 7, 2002, when he signed a memorandum stating that the Third Geneva Convention — the one regarding the treatment of enemy prisoners taken in wartime — did not apply to members of al-Qaeda or the Taliban. That signature led directly to the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay. It was his single most callous and despicable act. It stands at the heart of the national embarrassment that was his presidency.

Full essay.

Here is a link to the text of the Geneva Convention from the UN website. Here is the relevant portion. I've put into boldface those that Islamic terrorists do not meet. In the document, "Parties" refers to the signing countries. Since the terrorists are not the official forces of a specific country, they cannot count as regular troops.

Article 4

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:

1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.

2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the following conditions:

(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;

(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;

(c) That of carrying arms openly;

(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.


3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.

4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the annexed model.

5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other provisions of international law.

6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.

B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:

1. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to internment.

2. The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.

C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Convention.

Article 5

The present Convention shall apply to the persons referred to in Article 4 from the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release and repatriation.

Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.


So, let's summarize Klein's mistakes. (1) He does not demonstrate how the Geneva Convention could apply to captured terrorists. (2) He assumes that not treating terrorists according to the non-applicable Geneva Convention automatically led to abuses such as at Abu Ghraib. (3) He does not offer a rigorous, legal definition of torture, thereby allowing him to include underwear on the head and dog leashes. (4) He ignores successful follow-up actions based on intelligence obtained by water-boarding.

At least TIME magazine is a declining forum for this nonsense.

08/01: Shamocrat

One of the Christmas gifts I received is a day-by-day calendar that gives English words that have fallen out of use. Put together by Jeffrey Kacirk, each day also includes a tidbit of history.

Today's word is shamocrat: One who pretends to be possessed of wealth, influence, rank, or indeed any quality which is only conspicous by its absence. Citation is to John Farmer's Americanisms Old and New (1889).

I thought of this word when listening to a portion of Barak Obama's address on the economy. When it comes to economic knowledge, the guy is a shamocrat. The New Deal did not bring the Great Depression to an end. As a general rule seen in modern history, increased government control and manipulation of an economy does not bring prosperity, rather, economies are damaged by too much government involvment. Some regulation is necessary to prevent abuse and preserve free markets, we learned in the late 19th century. But too much government involvment results in ordinary people being trapped in underperforming economies.

Recessions are not catastrophes signaling the end of free markets. Though they are painful, they seem a necessary evil in free markets. Our nation has survived about twenty recessions and depressions in its history. Would it be nice to have no recessions? Of course. But we rarely are given the choice between perfection and imperfection. Rather, we must choose between various imperfections, choosing the lesser evil. Totally free markets led to abuses, so has too much government involvment.

Obama's plan seems the idea of a shamocrat.
From G. Washington, the indispensible man. Story here from Brits At Their Best.
Reflecting back on the star-crossed eight years of the George Bush administration, the outgoing chief executive might feel some gratitude to his predecessor. In a perverse way, Bill Clinton and his desperate campaign to retain power in the face of scandal probably saved the Bush presidency.

The framers designed impeachment as the ultimate (as in last resort) "check" against the misuse of executive and/or judicial power. Congress has used the weapon of impeachment sparingly over the course of American history. Two presidents, Washington and Jackson, when faced with a quarrelsome opposition in Congress, dared the legislative branch to impeach. On both occasions, Congress wisely demurred.

Jeffersonian Republicans (forerunners to the modern Democratic Party) pushed to consolidate gains against the Federalist Party and remove a troublesome remnant of the opposition within the judiciary. Through mostly good luck and/or providence, the scheme failed. In the aftermath of the Civil War, Radical Republicans attempted to remove the beleaguered Southern Unionist, Andrew Johnson. The Senate failed to convict the President (just barely), but the legislative succeeded in diminishing the executive for a generation. The power of the presidency did not make a real comeback until the administration of Theodore Roosevelt.

In 1974, a resurgent legislative branch finally succeeded in toppling a president. Although the House of Representatives never formally impeached him, Richard Nixon resigned once leaders of his own party assured him that he faced certain removal.

Enter Bill Clinton.

Initially, I believed that the low crimes and misbehavior of President Bill Clinton did not meet the threshold of constitutional removal from office, but it merited resignation. That is, although not quite impeachment-worthy, Bill Clinton's lying, cheating, and shameful behavior tainted the presidency and compromised the national security of the United States; therefore, an honorable President, made to confront his misdeeds, would have fallen on his public sword and slunk off into the shadows of American public life. But, alas, President Clinton did not see it that way, and he determined to hunker down and hold on to power with every ounce of his prodigious instinct for survival.

In the midst of his simultaneously craven and courageous full-court press to stay in office, I began to detest President Clinton and the gutter brawl he waged to preserve his power. Although I voted against him twice, it is important to note that I had never been a Clinton-hater before Monica. Before it was over, however, I loathed Bill Clinton and his entire team. In the heat of the moment, I cheered for impeachment, and I cursed the day he was acquitted (or "not proved") on all charges.

Today, I look back on impeachment sheepishly. Perhaps we over-reacted. Bill Clinton was pathologically untruthful, egregiously self-absorbed, and disdainful of many of the traditional social mores that serve to limit the worst excesses of human behavior. Worse, he seemed to view himself as above the law (although he was never formally charged with any criminal behavior).

On the other hand, we the citizenry duly elected him as president twice, and he clearly maintained the overwhelming support of the American people during the very worst of the revelations concerning his conduct. We got the leadership we desired. While the impeachment charges were serious and valid, they were also the product of overheated politics.

Looking back, the impeachment of Bill Clinton seems ill-advised, and his decision to eschew the myriad calls for resignation appears far-sighted. I grudgingly believe that he acted judiciously in riding out the storm. If he had left office under the pressure of the moment, the institution of the presidency would have suffered significant damage, and every president forward would have faced intense pressure to resign in moments of crisis and personal embarrassment.

More practically, one can reasonably argue that Bill Clinton's decision to fight for power, and his ultimate victory, saved the presidency of George Bush. Understanding the lessons of 1999, the Democrats of 2007 went to work to derail this president the old fashioned way (through obstructionism and violent calumny). Standing against fierce calls for impeachment proceedings from the left-wing fringe of the party, Democratic Leadership opted to wait for and work toward the Election of 2008 as the appropriate moment to chastise a president they had come to detest.

Who can doubt that an impeachment charade during the spring and summer of 2007 would have been a violently destructive and destabilizing national experience? Ironically, Bill Clinton's primal impulse to stand and fight back in 1998 played an essential role in securing our reprieve from a pathetic partisan show trial in 2007. Going forward, the consequences of the Clinton showdown will serve as a cautionary tale for any opposition majority. This is a good thing.

UPDATE: Welcome HNN readers. We are honored by the link.
Make sure the Witherspoon Institute is on your radar. Scholarly, thoughtful, needful.

Website.

The Witherspoon Institute is an independent research center that works to enhance public understanding of the moral foundations of free and democratic societies. Located in Princeton, New Jersey, the Institute promotes the application of fundamental principles of republican government and ordered liberty to contemporary problems through a variety of centers, research programs, seminars, consultations, and publications.

Here are the Senior Fellows:

Gerard V. Bradley is the Director of the Center on Religion and the Constitution of the Witherspoon Institute and Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School.

Thomas D. D'Andrea is the Director of the International Society for Legal and Moral Philosophy (INSOLM) and a Fellow at Wolfson College, Cambridge University.

Jean Bethke Elshtain is the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Professor of Social and Political Ethics at the University of Chicago and the Thomas and Dorothy Leavy Chair in the Foundations of American Freedom at Georgetown University.

Robert P. George is the Director of the Program in Political Thought and Constitutional Government and the Herbert W. Vaughan Senior Fellow of the Witherspoon Institute. He is the McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the James Madison Program in American ideals and Institutions at Princeton University.

Marcus Grompe is a professor in the Department of Molecular and Medical Genetics and Pedieatrics at Oregon Health and Sciences University.

John Haldane is a Professor in the Department of Moral Philosophy and the Director of the Centre for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs at the University of Saint Andrews, Scotland.

Kevin T. Jackson is the Director of the Program in Business and Ethics, Senior Fellows of the Witherspoon Institute and Professor of Business Ethics at Fordham University's School of Business in New York City.

Harold James holds dual appointments as Professor of Economic History in the Department of History and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and is Director of the Program in European Politics and Society, all of Princeton University.

Byron Johnson is the Director of the Program in Religion and Civil Society, a Senior Fellow of the Witherspoon Institute, and Director of the Institute for Studies of Religion at Baylor University.

Robert C. Koons is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Program in Western Civilization and American Institutions at the University of Texas in Austin.

John Londregan holds dual appointments as Professor in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

Daniel N. Robinson a Professor and Faculty Fellow on the Philosophy Faculty of Oxford University and Visiting Senior Member of Linacre College. He is also Distinguished Professor, Emeritus, Georgetown University.
I love the smell of ocean-water soaked tea in the morning.

Brits at Their Best has the story.
I began writing this at some point in 2007, unaware of the positive changes that would have spread over Iraq by the spring of 2008, the looming economic meltdown that would begin in late summer, or the historic crossroads presented by the fall election. This post is incomplete and somewhat indistinct (it looks like I might have been attempting a great treatise on American government). No matter, for lack of anything better to say right now, I am releasing it as an unfinished thought from that moment in time.

Is the United States of America a democracy?

A caller to C-SPAN's Washington Journal a few weeks back, representing himself as a lifelong Republican loyalist, wanted to know why this president seemed bound and determined to wreck "his party" by flying in the face of the overwhelming expression of the popular will on Iraq and the "children's health" bill?

A letter writer to the Waco Tribune Herald (but you may insert any town USA), disgusted with "Bush's war," proclaims:

"Politicians in this country are so disconnected from the constituents that democracy, the true definition of that word, simply does not exist here."

Resolved: The vast majority of Americans, as evidenced by public opinion polls and the last mid-term election, no longer support our presence in Iraq; therefore, the majority should rule, Congress should pass legislation to correct the President's failed policy, and instruct the military to initiate a withdrawal sequence.

Resolved: Public opinion polling indicates that the vast majority of Americans suppport the Democratic Party's proposed expansion of SCHIP; therefore, the President should accede to the will of the people.

Right? Wrong.

Is the United States of America a democracy? Or, as high school history teachers and talk radio hosts like to ask, is the United States a republic?

Yes.

The answer is both--and then some. The United States is a pluralistic, quasi-federal, constitutional representative democracy with republican roots.

The Constitution of 1787 provides for republican government. When we pledge allegiance to the flag, we pledge allegiance to the "republic for which it stands." On the other hand, the clear intent of the framers lost out to a cultural revolution, which began almost as soon as the national government came into being and democratized American politics. History texts commonly refer to the great change as Jacksonian Democracy--but it is also correctly associated with Thomas Jefferson, the first two-party system, and the so-called Republican Revolution of 1800.

Definitions:

republic: a state in which supreme power rests in the body of citizens entitled to vote, exercised by representatives chosen directly or indirectly by them, and in which the head of government is not a monarch or other hereditary head of state.

democracy: government by the people; a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system; a state of society characterized by formal equality of rights and privileges.

How it happened:

The Patriots of the American Revolution hoped that they were birthing an age of republican government animated by virtue. However, people like James Madison quickly surmised that Americans were no more virtuous than humanity in general, and they conceived a government necessarily more realistic about the nature of man.

Therefore, the framers devised a fairly intricate system of divided government in which three jealous departments compete against one another and sometimes internally for authority. The system of checks and balances, which has served us so well, is essentially a framework for consensus government. Most of the time, little happens without broad agreement.

No one person has ever exerted ultimate control over the system. To date, no one faction or institution has proven capable of rising to the top of the greasy pole of American government for a dangerously extended period of time. Men and women come and go. Parties are born, rise, fall, pass away completely, and, sometimes, rise again. But the system perseveres.

What of majority rule?

Here is how majority rule works under Mr. Madison's plan for government:

Many diverse constituencies and institutions exert their influence on national decision making. Instead of public policy turning on a dime, the framers designed a system resistant to "temporary enthusiasms" and "popular passions."

A Side Question: What happens when the popular will is in opposition to the public interest?

American Revolution-era republicans hoped that statesman, when presented with hard choices, would choose wise governance over popular sentiment, accepting the consequences of doing the right but unpopular thing.

However, once the optimism gave way to realization, the framers scrambled to construct a system in which popular majorities exerted due influence without facilitating a "tyranny of the majority" (a phrase Alexis de Tocqueville would coin a generation later).

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