Good news. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled to uphold the Congressionally approved restrictions on partial-birth abortions. Story here. The 5-4 vote underscores the importance of the '08 elections. In all probability the next president will nominate one and perhaps two Supreme Court judges. We should be asking presidential candidates, and Senate candidates, what sort of judges they want on the courts.
Here is the link from the Supreme Court official site to the ruling (pdf file). I'll comment after I've read all 73 pages.
Here is the link from the Supreme Court official site to the ruling (pdf file). I'll comment after I've read all 73 pages.
17/04: Rights for Great Apes?
Category: Courts
Posted by: an okie gardener
Reader and commentator Photognome points us to this article on a court case in Austria that may give rights to apes.
Personally, I am against cruelty to animals, and think that the more intelligent animals (such as chimps, elephants, dolphins, etc) deserve special protection. I am not sure that the structure of "rights" is the best way to go, though. I see potential court problems if this is the approach taken.
On a related note, while I think the idea of human rights is a handy way of thinking and talking, the idea has its limits. Perhaps it is no accident that neither of the two pillars of Western thought--Greek philosophy and Judaism/Christianity--think in terms of rights. Both think in terms of justice tied into a suprahuman agency.
Personally, I am against cruelty to animals, and think that the more intelligent animals (such as chimps, elephants, dolphins, etc) deserve special protection. I am not sure that the structure of "rights" is the best way to go, though. I see potential court problems if this is the approach taken.
On a related note, while I think the idea of human rights is a handy way of thinking and talking, the idea has its limits. Perhaps it is no accident that neither of the two pillars of Western thought--Greek philosophy and Judaism/Christianity--think in terms of rights. Both think in terms of justice tied into a suprahuman agency.
Many thanks to good friend of the Bosque Boys, Tocqueville, who, in response to my request, offers this incisive primer on the standards of proof and some analysis in re the Scooter Libby trial and the ongoing deliberations.
Guest Blog: Tocqueville
There are generally three standards of proof in Anglo-American jurisprudence. The first, and perhaps easiest to satisfy, is proof by a "preponderance of the evidence." This simply means that something is more likely true than not. In layman's terms, this is sometimes described as 51% certainty. This is the standard of proof required for most civil trials (it is, for example, the proof required in a typical personal injury/negligence trial).
The next standard of proof is more difficult to satisfy. It is called proof by "clear and convincing evidence." In order to prove something by "clear and convincing evidence" the party with the burden of proof must convince the jury that it is substantially more likely than not that the thing is in fact true. In layman's terms, this might be described as 75% certainty. Clear and convincing is rarely used, but it does occasionally crop up in certain affirmative defenses (such as an insanity defense). It is a stricter requirement than proof by a "preponderance of the evidence," but not as rigorous as proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," which is required for a criminal trial.
Shortly before breaking for the weekend, the jury in the Scooter Libby trial asked U.S. District Judge Reggie Walton to clarify the legal definition for "reasonable doubt." When the jurors return to their deliberations on Monday, I expect that Judge Walton will most likely instruct them along the following lines:
"A reasonable doubt is a real doubt, based upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or lack of evidence, in a case. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, is proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs. However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond any possible doubt or proof to an absolute certainty."
Now think about that for a moment. Proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs. What are the most important of your affairs? Examples that come to mind include which school to attend, which person to marry, which job to accept, which house to purchase, which doctor to trust, which church to attend, who to leave your children with, and so on.
Now consider some of the statements the jury has heard in this trial. Byron York has done a fantastic job of laying out the case HERE. And now think about the legal standard for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Is this jury really prepared to convict this man on these witnesses' rapidly-fading memories and conflicting recollections in a politically-charged climate? I hope not.
Monday will mark the jury's ninth day of deliberation--a remarkably long period of time for a case such as this. And every day that the jury stays out deliberating, reasonable doubt has further opportunity to circulate around the jury room, to nest deeply in someone's conscience, and to find a permanent home there. If only one juror clings to that doubt, the judge must declare a mistrial. And a mistrial in this case will be as good as an acquittal for Libby. Fitzgerald lacks both the political capital and the energy to put the country through the expense of another prolonged trial.
One thing is for sure. We will find out this week the fate of Scooter Libby.
Guest Blog: Tocqueville
There are generally three standards of proof in Anglo-American jurisprudence. The first, and perhaps easiest to satisfy, is proof by a "preponderance of the evidence." This simply means that something is more likely true than not. In layman's terms, this is sometimes described as 51% certainty. This is the standard of proof required for most civil trials (it is, for example, the proof required in a typical personal injury/negligence trial).
The next standard of proof is more difficult to satisfy. It is called proof by "clear and convincing evidence." In order to prove something by "clear and convincing evidence" the party with the burden of proof must convince the jury that it is substantially more likely than not that the thing is in fact true. In layman's terms, this might be described as 75% certainty. Clear and convincing is rarely used, but it does occasionally crop up in certain affirmative defenses (such as an insanity defense). It is a stricter requirement than proof by a "preponderance of the evidence," but not as rigorous as proof "beyond a reasonable doubt," which is required for a criminal trial.
Shortly before breaking for the weekend, the jury in the Scooter Libby trial asked U.S. District Judge Reggie Walton to clarify the legal definition for "reasonable doubt." When the jurors return to their deliberations on Monday, I expect that Judge Walton will most likely instruct them along the following lines:
"A reasonable doubt is a real doubt, based upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial consideration of all the evidence, or lack of evidence, in a case. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, is proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs. However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond any possible doubt or proof to an absolute certainty."
Now think about that for a moment. Proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs. What are the most important of your affairs? Examples that come to mind include which school to attend, which person to marry, which job to accept, which house to purchase, which doctor to trust, which church to attend, who to leave your children with, and so on.
Now consider some of the statements the jury has heard in this trial. Byron York has done a fantastic job of laying out the case HERE. And now think about the legal standard for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Is this jury really prepared to convict this man on these witnesses' rapidly-fading memories and conflicting recollections in a politically-charged climate? I hope not.
Monday will mark the jury's ninth day of deliberation--a remarkably long period of time for a case such as this. And every day that the jury stays out deliberating, reasonable doubt has further opportunity to circulate around the jury room, to nest deeply in someone's conscience, and to find a permanent home there. If only one juror clings to that doubt, the judge must declare a mistrial. And a mistrial in this case will be as good as an acquittal for Libby. Fitzgerald lacks both the political capital and the energy to put the country through the expense of another prolonged trial.
One thing is for sure. We will find out this week the fate of Scooter Libby.
~~Tocqueville
Week before last, I observed:
If Scooter Libby is not guilty as sin, the MSM has done us a great disservice...I wonder if there is another side of the story.
Today in the Washington Post, Victoria Toensing rises for the defense (doing what she does best, prosecuting):
"There's a reason why responsible prosecutors don't bring perjury cases on mere "he said, he said" evidence. Without an underlying crime or tangible evidence of obstruction (think Martha Stewart trying to destroy phone logs), the trial becomes a mishmash of faulty memories in which witnesses can seem as guilty as the defendant. Any prosecutor knows that memories differ, even vividly, and each party can be convinced that his or her version is the truthful one.
"If we accept Fitzgerald's low threshold for bringing a criminal case, then why stop at Libby? This investigation has enough questionable motives and shadowy half-truths and flawed recollections to fill a court docket for months. So here are my own personal bills of indictment:"
Read the full (2200 words) article here.
UPDATE: It occurs to me that if you did not remember my previous post, you may have missed the point of this post. Please feel free to post in the comments your favorite defense of Libby article and/or your own thoughts.
If Scooter Libby is not guilty as sin, the MSM has done us a great disservice...I wonder if there is another side of the story.
Today in the Washington Post, Victoria Toensing rises for the defense (doing what she does best, prosecuting):
"There's a reason why responsible prosecutors don't bring perjury cases on mere "he said, he said" evidence. Without an underlying crime or tangible evidence of obstruction (think Martha Stewart trying to destroy phone logs), the trial becomes a mishmash of faulty memories in which witnesses can seem as guilty as the defendant. Any prosecutor knows that memories differ, even vividly, and each party can be convinced that his or her version is the truthful one.
"If we accept Fitzgerald's low threshold for bringing a criminal case, then why stop at Libby? This investigation has enough questionable motives and shadowy half-truths and flawed recollections to fill a court docket for months. So here are my own personal bills of indictment:"
Read the full (2200 words) article here.
UPDATE: It occurs to me that if you did not remember my previous post, you may have missed the point of this post. Please feel free to post in the comments your favorite defense of Libby article and/or your own thoughts.
11/12: Breyer-Scalia Debate
The Federalist Society now has the video (or audio only if you choose) available of the debate between Supreme Court Justices Stephen Breyer and Antonin Scalia. Link here.
Apropos to our recent discussion of Justice Stephen Breyer and his judicial philosophy, I am pleased to offer a sneak preview of this review, which will appear in the upcoming Winter issue of Modern Age.
Judicial Immodesty
by Cory L. Andrews
Active Liberty: Interpreting our Democratic Constitution, by Stephen Breyer. Alfred A. Knopf, 161 pages, $21.00.
Resulting from Harvard Law School’s distinguished Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Justice Stephen Breyer’s Active Liberty: Interpreting our Democratic Constitution is a remarkably unprincipled book. In its pages, Breyer proposes the substitution of judicial for legislative initiative as the primum mobile of national government, advances the primacy of a formless but catchy abstraction (the giddy but elastic nostrum “active liberty”) over the particulars of constitution and statute, and promotes a presumably democratic ideal (his own ethereal one, of course) over the rigors of public deliberation and consensus. In Breyer’s eager hands, the Constitution is transformed from a foundational document of enduring fixed principles into the breezy platitude that “democracy is good,” thereby granting judges a roving commission to do “democratic” things as they see fit. (Never mind that the architects of the Constitution actually sought to mute popular democracy rather than accentuate it.)
Judicial Immodesty
by Cory L. Andrews
Active Liberty: Interpreting our Democratic Constitution, by Stephen Breyer. Alfred A. Knopf, 161 pages, $21.00.
Resulting from Harvard Law School’s distinguished Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Justice Stephen Breyer’s Active Liberty: Interpreting our Democratic Constitution is a remarkably unprincipled book. In its pages, Breyer proposes the substitution of judicial for legislative initiative as the primum mobile of national government, advances the primacy of a formless but catchy abstraction (the giddy but elastic nostrum “active liberty”) over the particulars of constitution and statute, and promotes a presumably democratic ideal (his own ethereal one, of course) over the rigors of public deliberation and consensus. In Breyer’s eager hands, the Constitution is transformed from a foundational document of enduring fixed principles into the breezy platitude that “democracy is good,” thereby granting judges a roving commission to do “democratic” things as they see fit. (Never mind that the architects of the Constitution actually sought to mute popular democracy rather than accentuate it.)
Earlier this week, Chris Wallace interviewed Justice Stephen Breyer. The exchange aired this morning on Fox News Sunday (full transcript here, scroll down for Justice Breyer).
When queried about his 2003 vote to uphold the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform law, Justice Breyer responded:
"I think what I said was, when you get a case like that, you start to look to slogans to decide the case. It won't work.
"The First Amendment itself, "the freedom of speech," doesn't tell you the answer. Nor does a slogan.
"If you want to use the slogan, "Money is at stake, not speech," that seems to work. That means they can regulate anything. But if you think about it for two minutes, you realize that money is very important to speech, because no one can run for office and have his message heard without money. So the First Amendment is involved.
"Then if you think the opposite, "Well, wait a minute, these campaign finance limits, what they're doing is they are telling the person who wants to give $20 million that he can't finance all the speech he wants. Doesn't that violate the First Amendment?" I'd say that's a slogan. Why? Because think about that First Amendment. It was done, enacted, passed, to help our country of now 300 million citizens run fair and free elections.
"The very point of speech in an election is to get a message across. And that may mean, in part, that you don't want one person's speech, that $20 million giver, to drown out everybody else's. So if we want to give a chance to the people who have only $1 and not $20 million, maybe we have to do something to make that playing field a little more level in terms of money. If you accept that at all, you've suddenly bought in to the proposition that there are First Amendment interests on both sides of this equation [empahsis added].
"And once you're there, you see this problem is complicated. And once you see it is complicated, you begin to factor in to what extent do we defer to Congress. And the answer is going to be quite a lot but not completely."
"I used that word, "purpose," to help me in a case where the language isn't clear, where the history isn't clear, where the tradition isn't clear, where the precedents aren't clear, that we have to decide how in that realm of ambiguity to apply the value that's permanent and always there, free speech, to a modern, difficult situation."
When queried about his 2003 vote to uphold the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform law, Justice Breyer responded:
"I think what I said was, when you get a case like that, you start to look to slogans to decide the case. It won't work.
"The First Amendment itself, "the freedom of speech," doesn't tell you the answer. Nor does a slogan.
"If you want to use the slogan, "Money is at stake, not speech," that seems to work. That means they can regulate anything. But if you think about it for two minutes, you realize that money is very important to speech, because no one can run for office and have his message heard without money. So the First Amendment is involved.
"Then if you think the opposite, "Well, wait a minute, these campaign finance limits, what they're doing is they are telling the person who wants to give $20 million that he can't finance all the speech he wants. Doesn't that violate the First Amendment?" I'd say that's a slogan. Why? Because think about that First Amendment. It was done, enacted, passed, to help our country of now 300 million citizens run fair and free elections.
"The very point of speech in an election is to get a message across. And that may mean, in part, that you don't want one person's speech, that $20 million giver, to drown out everybody else's. So if we want to give a chance to the people who have only $1 and not $20 million, maybe we have to do something to make that playing field a little more level in terms of money. If you accept that at all, you've suddenly bought in to the proposition that there are First Amendment interests on both sides of this equation [empahsis added].
"And once you're there, you see this problem is complicated. And once you see it is complicated, you begin to factor in to what extent do we defer to Congress. And the answer is going to be quite a lot but not completely."
"I used that word, "purpose," to help me in a case where the language isn't clear, where the history isn't clear, where the tradition isn't clear, where the precedents aren't clear, that we have to decide how in that realm of ambiguity to apply the value that's permanent and always there, free speech, to a modern, difficult situation."
Guest Blog
A few weeks ago, Bosque Boys friend, Gossenius, traveled to the nation's capital to witness arguments before the Supreme Court pertaining to his legal specialty, sentencing. I asked him to reflect on his experience for us. Thank you, Gossenisus, for this excellent piece, which is both meaningful and provocative.
We are in sad need of a little majesty. I say that as someone who usually eschews formality, and who is grateful that we live in a democracy and not in a monarchy of any sort, with the false elevation of an individual by the mere accident of birth.
What a little majesty can counteract, however, is the farce that our government has become. The legislature has been reduced to a crude reality show, with the driving motivation being to hurt the other side and to grab as much money off the conveyer belt of taxation to earmark for your own. The presidency has now been damaged by undeserved arrogance for four consecutive terms, held by two men who commonly betray not an ounce of humility even while pronouncing to all the importance of their Christianity.
What neither the legislative nor the executive branch gives us is a particular, necessary form of majesty—that of actual debate and consideration of an issue, where the people speak to the government as a sovereign of which they are a part. People in our country are kept away from their political leaders but for discussing superficialities, we have no question time in our Parliament, and our leaders’ public moments seem thoroughly bled of spontaneity and humanity.
There is still some majesty, though; we do still have the Supreme Court. I had the privilege of witnessing the Court in action for the first time two weeks ago, as they heard arguments in the case of Cunningham v. California, which involved the constitutionality of the California sentencing system. I was able to get a ticket to sit up front from Justice Souter’s chambers, close enough to smell the attorney’s fear.
The Supreme Court’s courtroom is not large. I have argued cases in four federal Courts of Appeal, and many of those rooms were about the same size. Nor is the décor of particular note; ornate carvings and huge draperies are pretty much the norm for appellate courts. What sets the Supreme Court apart is something more subtle: An aura of gravity reflected in the solemn movements of the marshals, the dress of the visitors (coat and tie were the norm), and the air of anticipation as the hour approached.
That air of solemnity became more pronounced as people took their places. The invited guests of the Justices sit to the right, the press to the left. Nina Totenberg arrived, and warmly greeted some of her colleagues. On the benches with me, I recognized a few other professors and sentencing specialists. There was a hush as the attorneys arguing the case swept into the room, clutching folders as they settled into the front desks. A respectful silence settled into the room for the next five minutes as we all waited anxiously for the arrival of the Justices.
And in they came, on the traditional call of “Oyez, oyez!” It almost seemed like we should applaud, the entrance was so grand. But it was not that kind of show. The Appellant approached the podium, and we were off.
It was quickly apparent that there is a reason that these guys (and Ginsburg) have risen to the level of the Supreme Court. Their exchange was witty, biting, informed, and meaningful. It was, in short, the best and most intense exchange of ideas on the topic I have heard in any forum. The attorneys almost faded into the background as the justices took on one another. The brightest minds seemed to be the ageless Stevens and uproariously brilliant Scalia, who is more entertaining (and probably smarter) than anyone you will see analyzing the things that he says. Even those of us who work in the field, who know the issues, who interact through scholarship with the Court, seemed taken aback by their ferocious attack of the issues.
At one point, Scalia, Stevens, and Roberts were finishing one another’s sentences, trading off policy considerations in a furious shorthand: “[Scalia] We could say the middle option is presumptively reasonable… [Stevens] Or we could require jury findings… [Roberts] Which could lead to a half-dozen jury trials in every case.” It was better than football.
Oh, you can complain all you want about “legislating from the bench,” but that is hardly a partisan issue. If you want to see some amazing judicial legislation, tune in for next week’s argument in Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, in which your heroes of the Right will want to judicially impose caps on punitive damages—something that seems to be well within the authority of Oregon’s legislature. The Court is and will be a check on the other branches of the government, and the mechanism is sometimes as rough and crude as the wrestling we see between the other branches. But the spectacle of it, the competing wisdoms on display—let’s not let that go too easily in a nation hungry for something with both grit and meaning.
Gossenius
A few weeks ago, Bosque Boys friend, Gossenius, traveled to the nation's capital to witness arguments before the Supreme Court pertaining to his legal specialty, sentencing. I asked him to reflect on his experience for us. Thank you, Gossenisus, for this excellent piece, which is both meaningful and provocative.
We are in sad need of a little majesty. I say that as someone who usually eschews formality, and who is grateful that we live in a democracy and not in a monarchy of any sort, with the false elevation of an individual by the mere accident of birth.
What a little majesty can counteract, however, is the farce that our government has become. The legislature has been reduced to a crude reality show, with the driving motivation being to hurt the other side and to grab as much money off the conveyer belt of taxation to earmark for your own. The presidency has now been damaged by undeserved arrogance for four consecutive terms, held by two men who commonly betray not an ounce of humility even while pronouncing to all the importance of their Christianity.
What neither the legislative nor the executive branch gives us is a particular, necessary form of majesty—that of actual debate and consideration of an issue, where the people speak to the government as a sovereign of which they are a part. People in our country are kept away from their political leaders but for discussing superficialities, we have no question time in our Parliament, and our leaders’ public moments seem thoroughly bled of spontaneity and humanity.
There is still some majesty, though; we do still have the Supreme Court. I had the privilege of witnessing the Court in action for the first time two weeks ago, as they heard arguments in the case of Cunningham v. California, which involved the constitutionality of the California sentencing system. I was able to get a ticket to sit up front from Justice Souter’s chambers, close enough to smell the attorney’s fear.
The Supreme Court’s courtroom is not large. I have argued cases in four federal Courts of Appeal, and many of those rooms were about the same size. Nor is the décor of particular note; ornate carvings and huge draperies are pretty much the norm for appellate courts. What sets the Supreme Court apart is something more subtle: An aura of gravity reflected in the solemn movements of the marshals, the dress of the visitors (coat and tie were the norm), and the air of anticipation as the hour approached.
That air of solemnity became more pronounced as people took their places. The invited guests of the Justices sit to the right, the press to the left. Nina Totenberg arrived, and warmly greeted some of her colleagues. On the benches with me, I recognized a few other professors and sentencing specialists. There was a hush as the attorneys arguing the case swept into the room, clutching folders as they settled into the front desks. A respectful silence settled into the room for the next five minutes as we all waited anxiously for the arrival of the Justices.
And in they came, on the traditional call of “Oyez, oyez!” It almost seemed like we should applaud, the entrance was so grand. But it was not that kind of show. The Appellant approached the podium, and we were off.
It was quickly apparent that there is a reason that these guys (and Ginsburg) have risen to the level of the Supreme Court. Their exchange was witty, biting, informed, and meaningful. It was, in short, the best and most intense exchange of ideas on the topic I have heard in any forum. The attorneys almost faded into the background as the justices took on one another. The brightest minds seemed to be the ageless Stevens and uproariously brilliant Scalia, who is more entertaining (and probably smarter) than anyone you will see analyzing the things that he says. Even those of us who work in the field, who know the issues, who interact through scholarship with the Court, seemed taken aback by their ferocious attack of the issues.
At one point, Scalia, Stevens, and Roberts were finishing one another’s sentences, trading off policy considerations in a furious shorthand: “[Scalia] We could say the middle option is presumptively reasonable… [Stevens] Or we could require jury findings… [Roberts] Which could lead to a half-dozen jury trials in every case.” It was better than football.
Oh, you can complain all you want about “legislating from the bench,” but that is hardly a partisan issue. If you want to see some amazing judicial legislation, tune in for next week’s argument in Phillip Morris USA v. Williams, in which your heroes of the Right will want to judicially impose caps on punitive damages—something that seems to be well within the authority of Oregon’s legislature. The Court is and will be a check on the other branches of the government, and the mechanism is sometimes as rough and crude as the wrestling we see between the other branches. But the spectacle of it, the competing wisdoms on display—let’s not let that go too easily in a nation hungry for something with both grit and meaning.
Gossenius
27/10: More 100:1
Good friend of the Bosque Boys, Mark Osler (real name), who maintains Osler's Razor is featured on NPR's Morning Edition this morning. He speaks on something we have covered in the past (see this post): the great disparity in sentencing guidelines in regards to cocaine possession versus crack cocaine possession, which also correlates to a racial disparity in sentencing.
Osler is a Baylor Law professor and former federal prosecutor; he specializes in sentencing.
The NPR story: "Crack Cocaine Sentencing Rules Hit 20."
For more information:
Douglas Berman's blog on sentencing.
Osler is a Baylor Law professor and former federal prosecutor; he specializes in sentencing.
The NPR story: "Crack Cocaine Sentencing Rules Hit 20."
For more information:
Douglas Berman's blog on sentencing.
16/06: 100:1
A good friend of the Bosque Boys, Baylor Law Professor Mark Osler, is on tour this week arguing before the 9th and 8th Circuit Courts (he argued before the 2nd two weeks ago). Although he is working in cahoots with the ACLU (he may even be a card-carrying member), we are nevertheless interested in Professor Osler's work and wish him well.
For some background on the case, which has to do with the old federal sentencing guidelines, which were deemed advisory rather than mandatory in the Booker case (January 2005), please see Douglas Berman's blog, Sentencing Law and Policy and, specifically, this round-up on Booker from the time of the decision.
The reassessment of Booker left open for reconsideration the statutory practice of sentencing crack cocaine possession at a ratio of 100:1 (100 times harsher) than powder cocaine possession. Among the multiple reasons why that ratio came into being, Professor Osler argues that race figured (and continues to figure) prominently.
For breaking news and background, again I recommend Berman's website: this post from Wednesday and the previous post from Tuesday and a whole host of links connected to those posts.
Good luck, Professor Osler. We are hoping that you will sit down at some point this summer and reflect on your experiences with these three circuit courts and share them with the Bosque Boys Community.
For some background on the case, which has to do with the old federal sentencing guidelines, which were deemed advisory rather than mandatory in the Booker case (January 2005), please see Douglas Berman's blog, Sentencing Law and Policy and, specifically, this round-up on Booker from the time of the decision.
The reassessment of Booker left open for reconsideration the statutory practice of sentencing crack cocaine possession at a ratio of 100:1 (100 times harsher) than powder cocaine possession. Among the multiple reasons why that ratio came into being, Professor Osler argues that race figured (and continues to figure) prominently.
For breaking news and background, again I recommend Berman's website: this post from Wednesday and the previous post from Tuesday and a whole host of links connected to those posts.
Good luck, Professor Osler. We are hoping that you will sit down at some point this summer and reflect on your experiences with these three circuit courts and share them with the Bosque Boys Community.
