Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution clearly provides that "the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States." Article I, Section 8 of said document clearly provides that "the Congress shall have Power...to declare War...to raise and support Armies" and control the "appropriation of money" to support the troops in the field (my emphasis).

Generally, we think of the executive and legislative war powers as complementary. But what happens when the two branches are no longer in accord. To what extent can one branch (Congress) employ its authority to withdraw the nation from war?

Walter Dellinger, current Duke University Law School professor and former solicitor general in the Clinton White House, and David Rivkin, a former Justice Department official in the Reagan Administration and consistently articulate defender of current war-on-terror policies, discussed that dilemma this morning on C-SPAN's Washington Journal (view entire program here).

For background:

You may read Dellinger's opening statement to the Senate Judiciary (here), which he revealingly titled: "Exercising Congress's Constitutional Power to End a War."

You may read Rivkin's equally revealingly "Constitutional Warp" (here) online at the Wall Street Journal, if you are a subscriber.

A brief excerpt of Rivkin for flavor:

"Congressional efforts to limit the exercise of these powers [commander-in-chief] in Iraq by, for example, purporting to limit the number of American troops there...would be unconstitutional, even if linked to an exercise of Congress's own appropriations power."

Rivkin and Dellinger agree that Congress has the Constitutional authority to end the war by defunding it. But they disagree as to whether Congress can lawfully designate money for approved actions only and/or "cap" the number of troops deployed in the theater.

It is an interesting argument.

However, in a much more practical sense, Congress as a whole is currently displaying the folly of delegating the conduct of the war to the legislative branch. For disparate reasons, which include studied logic, political calculation and "gut" feelings, a vast majority of Congressman are convinced that Iraq is a failed policy, which must be curtailed sooner or later, and sooner is better.

Notwithstanding, the House of Representatives is in a holding pattern, waiting for the Senate to come to agreement on a non-binding resolution expressing displeasure with the war and the President's proposed troop "surge." House Leadership is hoping that Republican defectors in the Senate will pave the way for Republican dissenters in the lower chamber.

But the power struggle in the Senate between presidential hopefuls jockeying to appear the most sagacious and statesmanlike or the most responsive democratic legislator or both has thus far produced a plethora of press conferences, dramatic sound bites and passionate rhetoric but very little of substance. Senators are hoping to come to some sort of consensus by the middle of the month. At that point, the House can begin their procedures. Notwithstanding, the Senate did take a break from posturing and "bloviating" to approve unanimously a new commanding general to implement the President's proposed action, which they plan to collectively disown at their earliest convenience.

Meanwhile, back at the Ranch, the President is going forward on his plan announced last month with all deliberate speed. By the time Congress has an official opinion, the executive and the armed forces will be deeply committed to the new strategy. In effect, Congress will voice a non-binding expression of their belief that the military operation to which we are already committed will not work.

The bigger point, however, is that the Senate specifically, and the legislative process in general, is designed to go slow. No student of the Constitution or American history would argue otherwise. Can we survive this war or any war in which the day-to-day operations are dependent on the efficiency of the Senate?